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I. INTRODUCTION 
Just over two years ago, the Maryland Court of Appeals decided 
Tracey v. Solesky, in which it modified Maryland common law related 
to strict liability in cases involving injuries caused by dogs.1  In doing 
so, it fueled a debate on the best approach to manage the effects of 
these types of injuries.  The response to the opinion was swift.  
Several bills that were intended to abrogate the effects of the 
decision were quickly presented in both the Maryland Senate and 
House of Representatives.2  However, the lawmakers were unable to 
come to an agreement on the best way to approach the issue.  Their 
efforts continued over the next two years until last year when a bill 
was finally approved and signed into law.3 
Although Solesky was neither a significant departure from the 
applicable law at the time nor an adoption of the alternative, more 
prevalent view in other jurisdictions, the action taken by the 
legislature abrogated its holding entirely.  As a result, the current 
applicable doctrine is a collage of different approaches and it is 
difficult to see how it protects victims of dog attacks more than they 
were protected before Solesky.  This Article will review the tort law 
doctrines that operate to regulate dog ownership and discuss the 
consequences of the newly approved statute. 
II. THE POLICY DEBATE BEFORE TRACEY V. SOLESKY 
With an estimated 73 million dogs in American households, it 
is fair to say that dogs are the most common household pets in the 
United States.4  In 2010, it was estimated that over 800,000 
households in Maryland included a dog.5  Additionally, pit bulls are 
the second most popular type of dogs registered in the state.6  
Although most of these pets are perfectly domesticated, about five 
million Americans experience a dog attack every year.7  Some of 
 
 1  Tracey v. Solesky, 50 A.3d 1075, 1079 (Md. 2012), superseded by statute, MD. 
CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-1901 (West 2014). 
 2  See discussion infra Part V. 
 3  See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-1901 (West 2014). 
 4  April Pruitt-Summers, Dog Bites Man: Liability for Dog Attacks Under the Animal 
Control Act, 96 ILL. B.J. 408, 408 (2008).  
 5  Errin K. Roby, Tort Liability Unleashed: Solesky v. Tracey and Landlord Duty to 
Third Parties, 43 U. BALT. L.F. 61, 61 (2012).  
 6  Interview with Frank Branch, representative of Maryland Votes for Animals, 
Discussion of Failure of Dog Bite Bill, WUSA9-TV (Aug. 15, 2012, 6:01 PM), 
http://www.wusa9.com/story/local/2012/08/15/3962053/. 
 7  Cynthia A. Mcneely & Sarah A. Lindquist, Dangerous Dog Laws: Failing to Give 
Man’s Best Friend A Fair Shake At Justice, 3 J. ANIMAL L. 99, 99 (2006). 
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these attacks result in death, and more than half of the victims of all 
attacks are children.8  For this reason, there is a long history of 
debates about the best policy approaches to deal with the issues 
raised by injuries caused by dogs.9 
The vast majority of dog attack related deaths have been caused 
by pit bulls.10  Consequently, the most prevalent debate in recent 
years has centered on whether that specific dog breed should be 
treated differently through legislation and regulation.11  As a result, 
a number of jurisdictions have enacted breed-specific regulations, 
which, in turn, have generated litigation to challenge their validity.12 
Adding to the debate, in 2012, the American Bar Association 
(“ABA”) adopted a resolution urging legislative bodies and 
governmental agencies to adopt comprehensive breed-neutral 
dangerous dog laws that ensure due process protections for owners, 
encourage responsible pet ownership, and focus on the behavior of 
both dog owners and dogs.13  The resolution did not dispute that 
there is a need to regulate dog ownership due to the conduct of 
certain dogs or their owners, but it emphasized that the regulation 
should be fair and neutral.14 
More importantly, however, the ABA explicitly took the 
position that breed-specific regulation has been the result of “panic 
 
 8  Id. 
 9  In Solesky, the court discusses some of the history of the early cases in Maryland, 
starting with the 1916 decision in Bachman v. Clark, 128 Md. 245 (1916), the first 
reported dog bite case involving a pit bull.  See Tracey v. Solesky, 50 A.3d 1075, 1076–
77 (2012), superseded by statute, MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-1901 (West 
2014). 
 10  According to a study by DogsBite.org, included in an amicus brief the 
organization filed in Tracey v. Solesky, between 2005 and 2010, pit bulls caused 105 
deaths in the United States.  Brief of Amicus Curiae Dogsbite.org in Support of 
Appellees at 14, Tracey v. Solesky, 50 A.3d 1075 (Md. 2012) (No. 53), 2011 WL 
6409239, at *14.  This number amounts to 58% of all deaths caused by dogs during 
those years.  Id. at 14.  Rottweilers have the next highest number of deaths caused 
during this period with 25.  Id. at 20.  Thirteen of the fourteen Americans killed by dogs 
in the first five months of 2013, or 93 percent, were killed by pit bulls and pit bull 
mixes.  Colleen Lynn, The Front Burner: Banning Pit Bulls Saves Lives and Protects the 
Innocent, THE ORLANDO SENTINEL (May 24, 2013), http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/ 
2013-05-24/news/os-ed-front-burner-pit-bulls-pro-20130523_1_pit-bulls-vicious-
dogs-many-dogs. 
 11  The American Kennel Club and the American Dog Breeders Association 
currently recognize three lines of pit bull terriers.  John Gibeaut, A Bite Worse Than Its 
Bark: Maryland Puts Pit-Bull Owners on Liability Notice, A.B.A. J. (Sep. 1, 2012), 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/a_bite_worse_than_its_bark_maryland
_puts _ pit-bull_owners_on_liability_notic/. 
 12  See infra notes 53–55. 
 13  Am. Bar Ass’n, RESOLUTION 100 (2012). 
 14  Id. 
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policymaking” enacted out of emotion that often fails to consider 
the effects on the rights of responsible dog owners.15  In short, the 
ABA has decided to oppose breed-specific regulation, calling it 
discriminatory because it considers such laws to be inconsistent 
with traditional notions of due process.16 
The report that accompanied the ABA’s resolution suggested 
that, instead of adopting breed-specific regulation, jurisdictions 
should look for alternative ways to promote safety and responsible 
dog ownership.17  As an example, it cited the fact that, following a 
series of well publicized dog attack incidents, the Illinois Legislature 
enacted comprehensive, non-breed-specific, generic public safety 
measures that targeted reckless owners and aggressive dog 
behavior.18 
What the report does not mention is that legislation is not the 
only alternative when it comes to regulating conduct.  Tort law 
doctrines also operate as forms of regulation.  In fact, one of the 
applicable statutes in Illinois, the Animal Control Act, is based on 
the principle that civil liability for injuries caused by dogs should be 
based on a very strict theory of liability.19  Thus, while avoiding 
discrimination among breeds of dogs in regulation, the state is using 
its tort law doctrines to impose a very high level of indirect 
regulation.  Not surprisingly, Illinois had the second highest total 
payouts and the largest number of dog bite insurance claims 
nationally in 2010.20 
 
 15  Id. at 1. 
 16  Id. at 2–7. 
 17  Id. at 1–10.  
 18  Id. at 9. 
 19  Section 16 of the Illinois Animal Control Act states that “[i]f a dog or other 
animal, without provocation, attacks, attempts to attack, or injures any person who is 
peaceably conducting himself or herself in any place where he or she may lawfully be, 
the owner of such dog or other animal is liable in civil damages to such person for the 
full amount of the injury proximately caused thereby.”  510 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/16 
(West 2006).  If the elements of this section are met, the defendant would be liable 
even if the plaintiff does not show negligent conduct on the part of the defendant 
regarding whether the dog had exhibited dangerous propensities in the past or that the 
defendant knew or should have known of the dog’s dangerous propensities.  Janis v. 
Graham, 946 N.E.2d 983 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (stating that one of the purposes of the 
Animal Control Act was to eliminate the common law requirement that an injured 
party must plead and prove that the animal owner knew or should have known about 
the animal’s dangerous propensities); Docherty v. Sadler, 689 N.E.2d 332 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1997) (“The purpose of the [Animal Control] Act was to eliminate the ‘one-bite rule’ 
which, at common law, required a plaintiff to plead and prove a dog owner either knew 
or was negligent in not knowing a dog had a propensity to injure people.”). 
 20  See Erline Aguiluz, Illinois Ranks No. 2 in Dog Bite Claims, Says State Farm, THE 
CHICAGO PERSONAL INJURY LAW BLOG (May 12, 2011, 9:07 AM), 
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A debate about the best regulatory approaches to manage the 
consequences of injuries caused by dogs would not be complete 
without a discussion of the effects of applicable civil liability 
doctrines.  This is one of the reasons why Tracey v. Solesky is so 
important. 
III. BASIC PRINCIPLES RELATED TO CIVIL LIABILITY FOR INJURIES CAUSED 
BY DOGS 
At the time Tracey v. Solesky was decided, the common law 
doctrines applied in Maryland in cases involving injuries caused by 
dogs were based on traditional principles of tort law, which 
recognized possible claims based on negligence and strict liability if 
the plaintiff could show that the defendant knew or should have 
known of the vicious propensities of the dog in question.21 
If the plaintiff chose to pursue the claim based on negligence, 
the plaintiff had to show that the defendant acted in a way that 
created an unreasonable risk of harm under circumstances where it 
was foreseeable that an injury could occur.22  In turn, to demonstrate 
 
http://chicagopersonalinjurylegalblog.com/2011/05/illinois-ranks-no-2-in-dog-bite-
claims-says-state-farm.html (citing a report released by State Farm Insurance 
Company).  In Maryland, State Farm Insurance, the state’s largest underwriter of 
homeowners insurance, paid out nearly $1.6 million for fifty-one dog bite claims in 
2012—about $31,000 per victim.  Fredrick Kunkle, Md. Bill Would Make All Dog Owners 
Liable for an Attack Regardless of Breed, THE WASHINGTON POST (Mar. 24, 2014), available 
at http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/md-politics/md-law-would-make-all-dog-
owners-liable-for-an-attack-regardless-of-breed/2014/03/23/301eb210-b031-11e3-
a49e-76adc9210f19_story.html. 
 21  Slack v. Villari, 476 A.2d 227 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984).  Presumably, a plaintiff 
could also bring a claim based on an intentional tort; but there do not seem to be any 
reported cases.  Cases based on an intentional tort theory for injuries caused by dogs 
are not common at least in part because of the real possibility that the intentional 
nature of the conduct would result in making insurance coverage unavailable. 
LITIGATING ANIMAL LAW DISPUTES: A COMPLETE GUIDE FOR LAWYERS 24–25 (Joan E. 
Schaffner & Julie Fershtman eds., 2009) (homeowners insurance policies and 
commercial liability policies typically exclude coverage for intentional conduct). 
 22  Slack v. Villari, 476 A.2d 227 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984) (stating that claimant 
must show that the owner exercised ineffective control of an animal in a situation 
where it would reasonably be expected that injury could occur, and injury does 
proximately result from the negligence); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 518 
(1965); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS §23 cmt. i (2000).  Examples of conduct that has 
been considered to be negligent under the circumstances include improper handling, 
keeping, restraining or training.  See, e.g., Miller v. Anderson, 728 P.2d 407 (Kan. Ct. 
App. 1986) (failure to keep dog confined); Mech v. Hearst Corp., 496 A.2d 1099 (Md. 
Ct. Spec. App. 1985) (failure to close gate on property guarded by trained attack dog 
and failure to post warning signs); McAbee v. Daniel, 445 S.W.2d 917 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
1968) (failure to keep child away from dog).  In addition, in some cases, the violation 
of a specific statute enacted to protect the public from possible injuries can be 
considered to be evidence of negligence.  Moore v. Myers, 868 A.2d 954 (Md. Ct. Spec. 
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that the circumstances were such that a possible injury was 
foreseeable, the plaintiff would have to argue that something about 
the dog or its history would make a reasonably prudent person 
believe that precautions should have been taken to minimize the 
risk of such an injury.23  These principles have not changed. 
In the end, the validity and possible success of a negligence 
claim hinges substantially on whether the evidence supports the 
conclusion that, given the circumstances, the conduct of the 
defendant should be considered negligent.  Given the possible 
difficulties in obtaining the necessary evidence, it is more common 
for plaintiffs to choose to bring the claim based on strict liability 
principles. 
In order to support a claim for strict liability, the plaintiff does 
not have to prove the defendant’s specific conduct nor that the 
conduct should be considered negligent.24  There are, however, 
different approaches to what the plaintiff must prove.  Before Tracey 
v. Solesky was decided, Maryland followed what can be called the 
“traditional” approach, which is reflected in Section 509 of the 
Second Restatement of Torts and Section 23 of the Third 
 
App. 2005); Moura v. Randall, 705 A.2d 334 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998).  For a violation 
of a statute or ordinance to constitute evidence of negligence, the resulting injury must 
be proximately caused by the violation of the statute, the injury must be to a member 
of the class of people that the statute or ordinance was designed to protect, and the 
injury sustained must be of the type that the statute was intended to prevent.  
Gardenvillage Realty Corp. v. Russo, 366 A.2d 101 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1976). 
 23  Moura, 705 A.2d at 341 (indicating that the dog owner’s knowledge of the 
propensities of the animal is relevant in determining the degree of control that a 
reasonable person would have exercised under the circumstances).  Examples of the 
type of evidence used to support this element of the claim include proof that the dog 
had a well-known reputation of being ill-tempered, that the defendant had been told 
by others that the dog had attacked people in the past, that the defendant warned 
others to stay away from the dog, that the defendant took special precautions to keep 
the dog away from others, that the defendant kept the dog muzzled and, of course, that 
the defendant admitted that the dog was vicious or that the dog had attacked others in 
the past.  LITIGATING ANIMAL LAW DISPUTES: A COMPLETE GUIDE FOR LAWYERS, supra note 
21, at 11.  See, e.g.,  Matthews v. Amberwood Associates Ltd. Partnership, Inc., 719 A.2d 
119 (Md. 1998) (knowledge imputed to defendant because employees had reported 
dog’s aggressiveness and viciousness); Goode v. Martin, 57 Md. 606 (Md. 1882) 
(knowledge presumed because owner kept dog tied); Warwick v. Mulvey, 127 N.W.2d 
433 (S.D. 1964) (defendant witnessed dog’s prior assault on delivery person); Mills by 
Mills v. Smith, 673 P2d 117 (Kan. Ct. App. 1983) (complaints from neighbors about 
animal running loose); Richmond v. Knowles, 265 A.2d 53 (Del. Super. Ct. 1970) 
(defendant warned children, including plaintiff, to stay away from dog); Fontecchio v. 
Esposito, 485 N.Y.S.2d 113 (Sup. Ct. 1985) (dog habitually chained up inside enclosed 
yard); Russell v. Lepre, 470 N.Y.S.2d 430 (Sup. Ct. 1984) (dog was kept muzzled and 
locked in basement when visitors were present). 
 24  See generally, DAN DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 941 (2d ed. 2011). 
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Restatement.25  According to this approach, the owner of a 
domesticated animal can be subject to liability for harm done by the 
animal if the owner knows or should know that the animal has 
abnormally dangerous propensities.26  This is true even if the owner 
has exercised the utmost care to prevent the animal from causing 
the harm.27  Likewise, a landlord who harbors a dangerous dog 
would be subject to the same liability.28 
This traditional view is based on the premise that domesticated 
animals are presumed to be docile and not dangerous enough to 
justify the imposition of strict liability, which is a theory of liability 
reserved for cases where injuries are suffered under circumstances 
that pose high levels of risk.29  However, the traditional view also 
recognizes the reality that not all animals are the same and that 
some do create unreasonable, indeed, abnormally high, risks to 
others.  In such cases, as explained in the Restatement, “[o]nce the 
 
 25  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS §23 (2000); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 509 
(1965). 
 26  It is important to say that liability “can” be imposed, instead of “would” be 
imposed, because the defendant can raise valid defenses that can result in the dismissal 
of the claim.  In Maryland, for example, it has been decided that assumption of the risk 
may be raised as a defense in a strict liability action for injuries caused by a dog.  See 
Benton v. Aquarium, Inc., 489 A.2d 549 (Md. Ct. App. 1985).  For a discussion of 
possible defenses applicable in strict liability cases, see LITIGATING ANIMAL LAW DISPUTES: 
A COMPLETE GUIDE FOR LAWYERS, supra note 21, at 20–24.  See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF TORTS §23 cmt. h (2000) (possible defense based on provocation). 
 27  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 509 (1965); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: 
LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 23 (2000).  Although the text of the Second 
Restatement does not explicitly say that the possible liability will be strict, it is clear 
that it is intended to be strict because evidence of the exercise of due care will not 
eliminate the possibility of liability as it would if the claim were for negligence.  The 
more recently approved Third Restatement has changed the section’s language to clarify 
that liability is strict; however, otherwise, the interpretation is the same as the 
interpretation of the Second Restatement’s language.  See also JOHN DIAMOND ET AL., 
UNDERSTANDING TORTS 250–51 (4th ed. 2010) (“Keepers of dogs, cats, horses, or other 
domestic animals are liable for injury caused by the animal only where the possessor 
knew or should have known of the animal’s aggressive disposition.”).  Maryland cases 
holding that the plaintiff must show the defendant knew or should have known that 
the animal had dangerous propensities include Bachman v. Clark, 97 A. 440 (Md. 
1916); Finneran v. Wood, 241 A.2d 579 (Md. 1968); Twigg v. Ryland, 62 Md. 380 (Md. 
1884); Mazur v. Scavone, 378 A.2d 1355 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977); Mech v. Hearst 
Corp., 496 A.2d 1099 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985); Slack v. Villari, 476 A.2d 227 (Md. 
Ct. Spec. App. 1984).  
 28  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 514 (1965). 
 29  The Third Restatement explains this view by using a “cost-benefit analysis” 
comparing the important benefits domesticated animals contribute to those who own 
them with the “modest level of danger” created by their ownership.  RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 23 cmt. b (2000).  Based on 
this analysis, it concludes that there is little support for applying the principles of strict 
liability in cases of injuries caused by “such ordinary animals.”  
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owner or possessor of such an animal knows or has reason to know 
of such a danger, strict liability, subject to limitations and defenses, 
becomes appropriate.”30 
In jurisdictions that follow this traditional common law 
approach, the big issue is whether the evidence available is sufficient 
to prove that the dog has vicious tendencies and that the defendant 
knew or should have known about the dangerous propensities of 
the dog in question.31  Although the vicious tendencies of the 
animal and the defendant’s knowledge can be inferred from 
surrounding circumstances, it is still incumbent upon the plaintiff 
to prove both and it is not always easy to do.32 
For this reason, most jurisdictions have adopted a second 
approach to strict liability in cases related to injuries caused by dogs, 
which does not require the plaintiff to show that the defendant had 
knowledge of the dangerous propensities of the dog.33  However, 
because the vast majority of jurisdictions that have eliminated the 
plaintiff’s need to prove knowledge have done so in cases that 
involved injuries caused by dogs, those jurisdictions in essence have 
created a separate doctrine that applies to dogs only.  In these 
jurisdictions, if the injury is caused by a dog, the scienter 
requirement is eliminated and the plaintiff would not have to prove 
knowledge of the vicious propensities of the animal.  However, if 
the injury was caused by any other type of domesticated animal, the 
scienter requirement would still apply.  According to the 
Department of Legislative Services of the Maryland General 
Assembly, thirty-two states have adopted this approach.34  
 
 30  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 23 cmt. 
b (2000).  See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 509 cmts. d, e (1965) (finding 
there is no social value in keeping animals that are vicious or have other dangerous 
propensities that are in excess of those necessary for their utility and are abnormal to 
their class). 
 31  DOBBS, supra note 24, at 945–47.  See also Dog Owner Liability, DOG LAW (last 
visited Jan. 5, 2015), http://doglaw.hugpug.com/doglaw_081.html. 
 32  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 509 cmt. g (1965) (stating that it is not 
necessary to show that possessor knows or should know that dog has attacked someone 
in the past and that it is sufficient to show knowledge that dog has exhibited a tendency 
to attack).  See supra note 23 for examples of the type of evidence that can be used to 
support a claim that the defendant knew or should have known of the vicious 
propensities of a dog. 
 33  DOBBS, supra note 24, at 947; Dog Owner Liability, DOG LAW (last visited Jan. 5, 
2015), http://doglaw.hugpug.com/doglaw_081.html.  See also supra note 19; MD. GEN. 
ASSEMB. DEP’T OF LEGIS. SERVS., FISCAL AND POLICY NOTE, S.B. 247, 2014 Sess., at 4 (2014), 
available at http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/2014RS/ fnotes /bil_0007/sb0247.pdf. 
 34  MD. GEN. ASSEMB. DEP’T OF LEGIS. SERVS., FISCAL AND POLICY NOTE, H.B. 73, 2014 
Sess., at 3–4 (2014), available at http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/2014RS/fnotes/ 
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Interestingly, however, the Restatement (Third) rejects this 
approach because it cannot justify imposing a different rule simply 
because the animal involved is a dog as opposed to any other type 
of domesticated animal.35 
IV. TRACEY V. SOLESKY: A THIRD POSSIBLE APPROACH TO STRICT LIABILITY 
In Tracey v. Solesky, the Court of Appeals of Maryland had the 
option to apply the existing common law at the time or to follow 
the approach adopted by a majority of jurisdictions.  Instead, 
however, the court decided to retain the basis of the common law 
approach and modify one of its elements, thus creating a new 
approach to the question. 
The facts in Solesky were not in dispute.36  During the course of 
one day, a pit bull attacked two boys in separate incidents.37  The 
dog almost killed the second boy.  As a result, the boy had to 
undergo five hours of surgery, after which he spent seventeen days 
in the hospital, suffered through additional surgeries, and spent a 
year in rehabilitation.38  There was no question that the injuries were 
caused by the dog, nor that the injuries were extremely severe.39  
Eventually, the boy sued the owner of the dog and his landlord 
 
bil_0003/hb0073.pdf; MD. GEN. ASSEMB. DEP’T OF LEGIS. SERVS., FISCAL AND POLICY NOTE, 
S.B. 247, 2014 Sess., at 3–4 (2014), available at http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/2014RS/ 
fnotes/bil_0007/sb0247.pdf (These states are Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, 
Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, 
Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South 
Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin).  See also 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 23 (2000); Mascola v. Mascola, 168 N.J. Super. 122, 
127 (App. Div. 1979) (The New Jersey statute eliminates the requirement that a 
plaintiff prove that the dog owner knew or should have known of the dog’s vicious 
tendencies); Janis v. Graham, 946 N.E.2d 983, 987 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (“[O]ne of the 
purposes of the Animal Control Act was to ‘eliminate the common law requirement 
that an injured party must . . .  prove that the animal owner knew or should have 
known about the animal’s dangerous propensities.’”) (citing Beggs v. Griffith, 913 
N.E.2d 1230, 1235 (2009)); In re Persechino, 423 B.R. 1 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2010) 
(stating that the purpose of the Connecticut dog bite statute is to “abrogate common-
law doctrine of scienter as applied to damages by dogs to persons and property . . . . “). 
 35  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 23 (2000) (“For common-law purposes, 
categorical distinction between dogs and all other animals is not justifiable . . . .  To 
impose strict liability, without regard to knowledge on the part of the defendant is also 
difficult to justify.”). 
 36  See Tracey v. Solesky, 50 A.3d 1075, 1078 (Md. 2012), superseded by statute, MD. 
CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-1901 (West 2014). 
 37  Id.  
 38  Id. 
 39  Id. 
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arguing both negligence and strict liability.40  The trial court granted 
a judgment for the defendant-landlord on the negligence claim on 
the grounds that there was no evidence of negligent conduct.  An 
intermediate court of appeals reversed and the landlord appealed.41 
In his appeal, the landlord raised a number of questions, the 
most important of which related to the validity of the strict liability 
claim.42  However, because the question was not accurately phrased, 
the court went on to address a different, and more relevant, issue.43  
That issue was whether proof of a dog’s breed, by itself, is enough 
to prove that specific dog’s dangerous nature and, therefore, 
whether proof of the defendant’s knowledge of the dog’s breed is 
enough to prove the defendant’s knowledge of the specific dog’s 
dangerous propensity.44 
At the time, the predominant view in Maryland, and in most of 
the United States, was that proof of a dog’s breed alone would not 
suffice to establish that a particular dog had dangerous 
propensities.45  However, based on its conclusion that there is now 
enough information to support the view that pit bulls are inherently 
dangerous, the court adopted a different view and remanded the 
 
 40  Id. 
 41  Id. 
 42  Tracey v. Solesky, 50 A.3d 1075, 1078–79 (Md. 2012), superseded by statute, MD. 
CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-1901 (West 2014). 
 43  The question presented by the appellant was whether the “harboring of 
American Staffordshire Terriers (more commonly known as “pit bulls”) by tenants 
[should be considered] an inherently dangerous activity for which landlords could be 
held strictly liable.”  Tracey, 50 A.3d at 1078.  The problem with the appellant’s 
formulation of the question is that it references the doctrine of “inherently dangerous 
activities” as the basis for the imposition of strict liability, which is a different doctrine 
than the one relevant to the case.  Typically, the analysis of a case asking whether an 
activity is inherently dangerous so as to justify the imposition of strict liability is 
resolved by applying the factors discussed in §520 of the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts.  However, these factors are not relevant to the determination of whether the 
owner of a domesticated animal should be held strictly liable for injuries caused by the 
animal and the common law applicable at the time was not based on an analysis of 
what constitutes an inherently dangerous activity. 
 44  Tracey, 50 A.3d at 1079. 
 45  Moura v. Randall, 705 A.2d 334, 344 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998) (stating that the 
fact that the dog was a rottweiller “was not sufficient to establish that he was vicious” 
for purposes of the strict liability claim); Slack v. Villari, 476 A.2d 227, 235 (Md. Ct. 
Spec. App. 1984) (noting that the fact that the dog was a doberman pinscher was not 
evidence of the dog’s dangerous propensity); Lundy v. California Realty, 216 Cal. Rptr. 
575, 580 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (stating that the fact that dog was a German 
Shepherd was not relevant to determining whether it had dangerous propensities); 
Eason v. Miller, 265 S.E.2d 340, 341 (Ga. 1980) (noting that breed alone is no 
indication of dangerous propensity).   
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case to be decided under a newly created standard.46 
The new standard adopted by the court still requires the 
plaintiff to prove that the defendant knew or should have known of 
the dangerous propensities of the dog; but it is based on essentially 
the opposite premise of the traditional common law view.  Whereas 
the traditional view starts from the premise that dogs are inherently 
docile, the standard adopted by the court in Solesky starts from the 
premise that pit bulls have inherent vicious propensities.  In turn, 
once it is determined that pit bulls have inherent vicious 
propensities, it follows that, if the defendant knows or should know 
that the dog is a pit bull, the defendant knows or should know that 
it has vicious propensities.  For this reason, according to the court’s 
new approach, a plaintiff could establish the necessary knowledge 
to justify the imposition of strict liability if the plaintiff simply 
shows that the defendant knew or should have known that the dog 
in question was a pit bull.47 
Needless to say, the consequences of the court’s ruling were 
significant.  As the court explained, by adopting the new approach, 
the court modified the elements of a cause of action based on strict 
liability for cases involving pit bulls.48  A plaintiff would no longer 
 
 46  The court supported this conclusion by citing its own comments in Matthews v. 
Amberwood Assoc. Ltd. P’ship, Inc., 351 Md. 544 (1998), other courts’ similar 
conclusions, and published articles and reports from the Albuquerque Humane 
Society, The American Veterinary Medical Association, the Annals of Surgery, and the 
Center for Disease Control.  These sources suggested in one way or another that pit 
bulls are more dangerous than other breeds either because they cause more injuries, or 
because the injuries they cause are more severe.  Matthews, 351 Md. at 563 n.4.  For 
instance, in Matthews, a negligence case, the court concluded that injuries by a pit bull 
were foreseeable due to pit bulls’ “extreme dangerousness” and their greater propensity 
to bite humans.  Id. at 562–63.  
 47  Specifically, the court stated:  
We hold that upon a plaintiff’s sufficient proof that a dog involved in an 
attack is a pit bull or a pit bull mix, and that the owner, or other person(s) 
who has the right to control the pit bull’s presence on the subject 
premises (including a landlord who has the right and/or opportunity to 
prohibit such dogs on leased premises as in this case) knows, or has 
reason to know, that the dog is a pit bull or cross-bred pit bull mix, that 
person is strictly liable for the damages caused to a plaintiff who is 
attacked by the dog on or from the owner’s or lessor’s premises.   
Solesky, 50 A.3d at 1089.  However, after a motion for reconsideration, the court limited 
the ruling to pure pit bulls, eliminating the references to pit bull “mixes.” Id. at 1096–
98. 
 48  Solesky, 50 A.3d at 1079.  It should be noted that the dissenting judges overstate 
the consequences of the decision when they write that “[i]n the words of the majority, 
the owner or landlord will be held strictly liable for any harm the dog causes” if the 
plaintiff meets the new requirements.  Id. at 1090 (Greene, J., dissenting).  This 
statement suggests that the holding creates absolute liability in cases involving pit bulls, 
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have to prove that the specific dog involved in the case had vicious 
propensities, nor that the defendant knew of those propensities.49  
The plaintiff would only have to prove that the dog was a pit bull 
and that the defendant knew or should have known the dog was of 
such a breed.50  If the defendant is a landlord, the plaintiff would 
then also have to show that the defendant knew or should have 
known of the presence of the dog on the leased premises and that 
the defendant had the right or opportunity to prohibit dogs on the 
leased property.51 
Second, the new standard would apply only to one specific 
breed of dogs, which is an unpopular and controversial approach to 
handling the problem of injuries caused by dogs.  As stated above, 
the Restatement Third rejects the notion of creating a standard of 
strict liability that differentiates dogs from other domestic animals, 
so it would be safe to assume that it would reject a new approach 
which isolates a specific breed.  Also, the new approach can be 
criticized for the same reasons that the ABA explicitly rejected the 
notion of breed-specific regulation.  It could be argued that it is 
another example of “panic policymaking” or the result of poorly 
informed emotion that failed to consider the effects on the rights of 
responsible dog owners.52 
Third, although the ruling in the case relates to strict liability, 
the reasoning behind it would make it easier for plaintiffs in 
negligence cases to support the element of proximate cause.  If it is 
the law in the jurisdiction that pit bulls are inherently dangerous, 
then it can be argued that it is reasonably foreseeable that all pit 
bulls can cause injury to someone. 
Finally, the new approach would put pit bull owners in the 
difficult position of having to take the risk of possible strict liability 
 
which is an incorrect reading of the decision.  
 49  Tracey v. Solesky, 50 A.3d 1075, 1079–80 (Md. 2012), superseded by statute, MD. 
CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-1901 (West 2014). 
 50  Id. 
 51  Id. at 1089. 
 52  The dissenting opinion in Solesky also complained that the court reached its 
conclusions about pit bulls without the benefit of expert evidence.  Id. at 1090 (Greene, 
J., dissenting).  Others have challenged similar conclusions.  See, e.g., Rose Eveleth, 
Owners, Not Breeds, Predict Whether Dogs Will Be Aggressive, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (March 
4, 2014), http://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/owners-not-breeds-predict-
whether-dog-will-be-aggressive-180949962/?no-ist (reporting on Rachel A. Casey et 
al., Human Directed Aggression in Domestic Dogs (Canis Familiaris): Occurrence in 
Different Contexts and Risk Factors, 152 APPLIED ANIMAL BEHAVIOUR SCIENCE 52, 52–63 
(2014), available at http://www.appliedanimalbehaviour.com/article/S0168-1591(13) 
00292-X/abstract. 
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or give up their family pet.  Under the circumstances, there is 
nothing a dog owner could do in advance to prevent liability if a pet 
pit bull with absolutely no history of violent behavior suddenly 
bites a person without provocation.  Other than giving up the dog, 
the only thing to do would be to obtain insurance to cover possible 
liability, which is sometimes difficult to do.53  And, given that the 
new approach would make it easier for plaintiffs to support both 
strict liability and negligence claims, pit bull owners’ insurance 
carriers might increase rates or limit coverage. 
On the other hand, the opinion can be defended against the 
criticism.  First, although breed-specific regulation is controversial 
and disfavored by the ABA, it is not uncommon and has been 
validated by courts.54  There is even one Maryland County that has 
prohibited pit bull ownership.55  Also, breed-specific regulation has 
proven to be popular with the general public.56 More importantly, 
Solesky was not the first court opinion to hold that a dog’s breed can 
 
 53  See Arin Greenwood, Pit Bull Owners Find That Good Dogs Face Bad Insurance 
Policies, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 3, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/ 
03/03/pit-bulls-insurance_n_4869750.html (discussing how difficult it can be to 
obtain insurance to cover possible liability for injuries caused by a pit bull).  This 
argument may not be as strong in Maryland, however.  According to the Department 
of Legislative Services of the Maryland General Assembly, only three of the top ten 
insurers who provide homeowners insurance in the state have exclusions or limits on 
coverage for injuries caused by pit bulls.  MD. GEN. ASSEMB. DEP’T OF LEGIS. SERVS., FISCAL 
AND POLICY NOTE, H.B. 73, 2014 Sess. (2014), available at http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/ 
2014RS/fnotes/bil_0003/hb0073.pdf; MD. GEN. ASSEMB. DEP’T OF LEGIS. SERVS., FISCAL 
AND POLICY NOTE, S.B. 247, 2014 Sess. (2014), available at http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/ 
2014RS/fnotes/bil_0007/sb0247.pdf. 
 54  See City of Toledo v. Tellings, 871 N.E.2d 1152, 1157 (Ohio 2007) (explaining 
that the state has a legitimate interest in protecting citizens from the dangers posed by 
pit bulls); McNeely v. United States, 874 A.2d 371, 391 (D.C. 2005); Colorado Dog 
Fanciers, Inc. v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 820 P.2d 644, 650 (Colo. 1991); Garcia v. Vill. 
of Tijeras, 767 P.2d 355, 360–61 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988).  See also Nathan Bass, Wayne 
County Town’s Pit Bull Ban Upheld, THE WEST VIRGINIA RECORD (Jan. 24, 2013, 4:00 AM), 
available at http://wvrecord.com/news/s-3962-state-supreme-court/257257-wayne-
county-towns-pit-bull-ban-upheld (reporting that the Supreme Court of West Virginia 
affirmed the constitutionality of the Town of Ceredo’s ordinance prohibiting the 
ownership of pit bull terriers within the city limits). 
 55  Prince George’s County prohibits owning, keeping, or harboring pit bull terriers.  
PRINCE GEORGE’S CNTY., MD., CODE § 3.185.01 (Supp. 2010). 
 56  In August of 2012, a strong campaign to repeal the ban on pit bulls in Miami-
Dade County, Florida failed when voters decided to retain it by a wide margin.  See 
Christina Hernandez, Julia Bagg & Willard Shepard, Miami-Dade Residents Vote to Keep 
Pit Bull Ban Tuesday, NBC (Aug. 13, 2012, 11:31 PM), http://www.nbcmiami.com/ 
news/local/Miami-Dade-Residents-Vote-on-Pit-Bull-Ban-Repeal-Tuesday-166056926. 
html; see also Tazi Phillips, Update: Miami Votes To Keep Pit Bull Ban, GLOBAL ANIMAL 
(Aug. 15, 2012), http://www.globalanimal.org/2012/08/15/miami-votes-to-repeal-
pit-bull-ban/79898/. 
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be used to prove that a certain dog has vicious propensities.57  In 
2003, for example, the Indiana Supreme Court held that, 
[even if] there is no evidence of an owner’s actual knowledge that his or 
her dog has dangerous propensities, the owner may nonetheless be held 
liable provided there is evidence that the particular breed to which the 
dog belongs has dangerous propensities.  And this is so even where the 
owner’s dog has never before attacked or bitten anyone . . . .  In essence, 
a jury may not infer that an owner knew or should have known of a dog’s 
dangerous or vicious propensities from the fact of a first time, 
unprovoked biting.  Rather, in such an instance, a jury may infer that the 
owner knew or should have known of the dog’s dangerous or vicious 
propensities only where evidence shows that the particular breed to 
which the owner’s dog belongs is known to exhibit such tendencies.58 
Second, if the jurisdiction is going to impose strict liability 
while requiring the plaintiff to show knowledge of the risk that the 
defendant creates by owning a dog, it seems logical and fair to allow 
the plaintiff to use all available evidence to support that claim.  If 
there is evidence available that shows that a certain breed is known 
to be vicious, then the plaintiff should be allowed to use that 
evidence.59 
Third, although the decision in Solesky does have the effect of 
instituting a breed-specific regulation, it does not ban pit bulls.  It 
simply places pit bull owners and their landlords on notice that 
keeping a pit bull creates certain risks for which they need to be 
ready.  Although they may not be able to completely eliminate those 
risks, owners and landlords can manage them by obtaining 
insurance and taking other necessary precautions to avoid possible 
injuries.  Given the risks involved, the additional cost related to 
insurance is just part of the overall cost of dog ownership or of 
leasing properties to dog owners.  Consistent with the principles 
behind the notion of strict liability, the opinion thus places the 
 
 57  See Poznanski v. Horvath, 788 N.E.2d 1255, 1259 (Ind. 2003); Thomas v. 
Weddle, 605 S.E.2d 244, 247 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004) (citing Griner v. Smith, 259 S.E.2d 
383, 388 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979)) (stating that knowledge of the danger posed by the 
dog’s breed is imputed to the defendant, regardless of the character or temperament of 
the individual animal); Radoff v. Hunter, 323 P.2d 202 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958) 
(indicating that the breed of dog may be considered in determining whether dog had 
dangerous propensities); Hood v. Hagler, 606 P.2d 548, 552–53 (Okla. 1979) (noting 
that the fact that the dog was part German Shepherd was considered relevant to finding 
that the dog had vicious tendencies); Thompson v. Wold, 289 P.2d 712, 715 (Wash. 
1955) (stating that the breed of dog is relevant to the question of whether the dog has 
dangerous propensities).   
 58  Poznanski, 788 N.E.2d at 1259–60. 
 59  It is possible that the dissenting judges in Solesky would agree with this position.  
One of the reasons why they disagreed with the majority opinion was that the court 
reached its conclusions about pit bulls without the benefit of expert evidence.  Solesky, 
50 A.3d at 1090 (Greene, J., dissenting).  See also supra note 48.  
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possible responsibility for injuries upon those who are in a better 
position to protect against the risks involved and to manage the cost 
of injuries.60 
V. THE REACTION TO TRACEY V. SOLESKY 
Even though there is a strong argument that Solesky’s approach 
to the application of strict liability in cases involving injuries caused 
by dogs was based on sound public policy, it quickly became very 
controversial.  According to the Fiscal and Policy Notes of the House 
and Senate bills that eventually became the recently adopted statute, 
the decision in Solesky “drew criticism from dog owners, animal 
advocacy groups, landlords, and insurers as news reports emerged 
relating to landlords banning pit bulls and animal shelters 
preparing for an influx of pit bulls.”61  Some reported that the 
decision triggered a sharp increase in the number of pit bulls sent to 
shelters, as landlords began requiring that tenants move out or get 
rid of their pit bulls.62 
In turn, as the ABA Journal reported, “pit bull owners and their 
advocates pressed the alarm button” and persuaded state legislators 
to work on enacting a bill to override the decision.63  Organizations 
such as the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to 
Animals, Best Friends Animal Society, and the Humane Society of 
the United States became active in the debate, holding rallies, 
issuing news releases, and testifying at hearings.64  However, the 
negative reactions to the opinion were not all about the same issues, 
and the differences of opinion became problematic as the legislature 
tried to propose a bill to abrogate the decision. 
The efforts to abrogate the holding in Solesky started in May 
2012, barely a month after the decision was issued, when the 
Maryland legislature called a special session to reconcile the state 
budget.65  The first round of bills drafted were ignored, however, as 
 
 60  Tracey v. Solesky, 50 A.3d 1075, 1088 (Md. 2012), superseded by statute, MD. 
CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-1901 (West 2014). 
 61  MD. GEN. ASSEMB. DEP’T OF LEGIS. SERVS., FISCAL AND POLICY NOTE, H.B. 73, 2014 
Sess., at 3 (2014), available at http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/2014RS/fnotes/bil_0003/ 
hb0073.pdf; MD. GEN. ASSEMB. DEP’T OF LEGIS. SERVS., FISCAL AND POLICY NOTE, S.B. 247, 
2014 Sess., at 3 (2014), available at http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/2014RS/fnotes/ 
bil_0007/sb0247.pdf. 
 62  Kunkle, supra note 20. 
 63  Gibeaut, supra note 11. 
 64  Kunkle, supra note 20. 
 65  Maryland Legislature Mutes Landmark Ruling, Tracey v. Solesky, During 2014 
Legislative Session, DOGSBITE BLOG (June 2, 2014), http://blog.dogsbite.org/2014/06/ 
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the legislative session was dedicated entirely to state financing 
issues.66  Instead, at the end of May, the House and Senate formed a 
ten member joint task force to study Solesky’s impact and to make 
recommendations on legislation.67 
At the task force hearings, critics of the decision in Solesky raised 
concerns over the following: (1) the notion of imposing strict 
liability on a dog owner based on breed-specific standards; (2) the 
lack of guidance as to what constitutes a pit bull; and (3) the 
negative effects on the housing rental market.68  The task force did 
not propose a bill, but, as a result of its work, bills to abrogate the 
decision in Solesky were introduced in both the House and Senate in 
August 2012, when the legislature called a second special session to 
discuss issues related to gambling regulation.69  However, the bills 
did not generate enough support and failed to be enacted into law.70 
The Senate’s bill, which was introduced first, essentially 
adopted what is now the majority approach in the United States.71  
Subject to a few exceptions, it endorsed the imposition of strict 
liability for dog owners even in the absence of evidence of previous 
incidents involving the dog in question.72  For landlords, it adopted 
the traditional approach which would require the plaintiff to show 
the landlord knew of the dangerous propensity of the dog and of 
 
maryland-legislature-mutes-landmark-ruling-tracey-v-solesky.html.  See also, MD. GEN. 
ASSEMB. DEP’T OF LEGIS. SERVS., FISCAL AND POLICY NOTE, S.B. 247, 2014 Sess., at 3 (2014), 
available at http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/2014RS/fnotes/bil_0007/sb0247.pdf. 
 66  Id. 
 67  See Md. Lawmakers Form Pit Bull Task Force, CBS BALTIMORE (May 30, 2012), 
http://baltimore.cbslocal.com/2012/05/30/md-lawmakers-form-pit-bull-task-force/. 
 68  MD. GEN. ASSEMB. DEP’T OF LEGIS. SERVS., FISCAL AND POLICY NOTE, H.B. 73, 2014 
Sess., at 3 (2014), available at http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/2014RS/fnotes/ 
bil_0003/hb0073.pdf; MD. GEN. ASSEMB. DEP’T OF LEGIS. SERVS., FISCAL AND POLICY NOTE, 
S.B. 247, 2014 Sess., at 3 (2014), available at http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/2014RS/ 
fnotes/bil_0007/sb0247.pdf. 
 69  See supra note 68.  See also Maryland Legislature Mutes Landmark Ruling, Tracey v. 
Solesky, During 2014 Legislative Session, DOGSBITE BLOG (June 2, 2014), 
http://blog.dogsbite.org/2014/06/maryland-legislature-mutes-landmark-ruling-tracey 
-v-solesky.html; Susan Rappaport et al., Pit Bulls: Maryland’s Solesky Case Changes 
Liability Standard, 44 U. BALT. L.F. 60, 61–62 (2013). 
 70  See supra note 69. 
 71  MD. GEN. ASSEMB. DEP’T OF LEGIS. SERVS., FISCAL AND POLICY NOTE, S.B. 247, 2014 
Sess. (2014), available at http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/2014RS/fnotes/bil_0007/ 
sb0247.pdf.  See also Anthony Solesky, Father of Pit Bull Mauling Victim, to Testify at 
Hearings, DOGSBITE.ORG (Aug. 15, 2012), http://blog.dogsbite.org/2012/08/anthony-
solesky-father-of-pit-bull.html. 
 72  MD. GEN. ASSEMB. DEP’T OF LEGIS. SERVS., FISCAL AND POLICY NOTE, S.B. 247, 2014 
Sess. (2014), available at http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/2014RS/fnotes/bil_0007/ 
sb0247.pdf. 
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the presence of the dog on the premises.73  In contrast, the House 
version of the bill proposed the imposition of strict liability only for 
dog owners whose dogs caused injuries while “at large” and would 
have eliminated liability altogether if a defendant could show 
contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff.74  The House 
version of the bill was, therefore, incompatible with the version of 
the Senate and the legislators found it impossible to reconcile their 
differences.75 
From there, during regular legislative session between January 
and April 2013, the House and the Senate attempted to compromise 
by designing bills that eliminated much of their original ideas.76  
The Senate and the House abandoned their preferred approach and 
drafted compromise bills based on a completely new approach.  
Under the new bills, a dog attack would give rise to a rebuttable 
presumption of knowledge, on the part of the owner, that the dog 
had vicious propensities.77  The House approved one bill, which 
received a hearing in the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee, 
but no further action was taken.78  An equivalent bill proffered by 
 
 73  Id. 
 74  H.B. 73, 2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2014) (introduced Jan. 8, 2014). 
 75  For a short video of an interview with Senator Jamie Raskin on why the attempt 
to approve a bill failed, see supra note 6. 
 76  S.B. 160, 2013 Leg (Md. 2013); H.B. 78, 2013 Leg (Md. 2013).  See also Summary 
of House and Senate Hearings, DOGSBITE BLOG (Feb. 7, 2013), 
http://www.dogsbite.org/media/maryland/senate-hearing-feb-2013.mp3 (testimony 
of the Solesky family during a hearing before the Senate on February 5, 2013); Colleen 
Lynn, Written Testimony by DogsBite.org: Opposition to Senate Bill 160, DOGSBITE.ORG 
(Feb. 5, 2013), http://www.dogsbite.org/pdf/written-testimony-dogsbite-senate-
committee-02052012.pdf (testimony of DogsBite.org during a hearing before the 
Senate on February 5, 2013). 
 77  S.B. 160, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2013) (establishing that, in an action against 
an owner of a dog for damages for personal injury or death caused by the dog, evidence 
that the dog caused the injury or death creates a rebuttable presumption that the owner 
knew or should have known that the dog had vicious or dangerous propensities—
providing that the presumption may not be rebutted as a matter of law, but that the 
presumption may be rebutted by specified clear and convincing evidence); H.B. 78, 
2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2013) (establishing that, in an action against a dog owner 
for damages for personal injury or death caused by the dog, evidence that the dog 
caused the injury or death creates a rebuttable presumption that the owner knew or 
should have known that the dog had vicious or dangerous propensities); Id. (stating 
that, in an action against a person other than an owner of a dog for specified damages, 
the common law prior to April 1, 2012, is retained as to the person without regard to 
the breed or heritage of the dog). 
 78  MD. GEN. ASSEMB. DEP’T OF LEGIS. SERVS., FISCAL AND POLICY NOTE, H.B. 73, 2014 
Sess., at 3 (2014), available at http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/2014RS/fnotes/bil_0003/ 
hb0073.pdf; MD. GEN. ASSEMB. DEP’T OF LEGIS. SERVS., FISCAL AND POLICY NOTE, S.B.. 247, 
2014 Sess., at 7 (2014), available at http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/2014RS/fnotes/ 
bil_0007/sb0247.pdf. 
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the Senate and accompanied by a conference committee report 
initially passed both houses, but failed to pass a third reading in the 
House before the end of the 2013 legislative session.79 
Reportedly, the attempt to enact the bills failed because the 
legislators could not agree on the level of proof needed by a 
defendant to rebut the presumption of knowledge of a dog’s 
propensity to bite.  The House bill required only a “preponderance 
of evidence.”  When the Senate amended the bill and raised the 
threshold to “clear and convincing evidence” in cases involving 
children, the House refused to agree to the change, and, once again, 
the bill failed to move forward.80 
When the regular legislative session opened in 2014, new 
rebuttable presumption bills were introduced in both chambers.81  
In yet another attempt to compromise, the new bill avoided the 
issue of the level of proof needed by including a new section meant 
to guarantee that the issue of whether the presumption is rebutted 
would be left to the jury.82  An accompanying bill in the House also 
retained the strict liability approach for cases in which the injuries 
were caused by dogs that were “at large.”83  After holding hearings, 
which included testimony from the Solesky family and a failed 
attempt by members of the Senate to amend the bill back to the 
strict liability approach they had approved in 2012, the Senate 
approved a bill mirroring the two approved by the House.84  Finally, 
once both houses reconciled and approved a bill that included the 
rebuttable presumption approach, abrogated the decision in Solesky 
as to landlords, and recognized potential strict liability for injuries 
 
 79   See supra note 78. 
 80   See Colleen Lynn, Maryland High Court Ruling Stands: Pit Bulls are ‘Inherently 
Dangerous’, DOGSBITE BLOG (Apr. 17, 2013), http://blog.dogsbite.org/2013/04/ 
maryland-high-court-ruling-stands-pit-bulls-are-inherently-dangerous.html. 
    81  See H.B. 73, 2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2014) (introduced Jan. 8, 2014), available 
at http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/2014RS/bills/hb/hb0073f.pdf ; S.B. 247, 2014 Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (Md. 2014) (introduced Jan. 17, 2014), available at 
http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/2014RS/bills/sb/sb0247f.pdf.  
 82   See H.B. 73, 2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2014) (introduced Jan. 8, 2014), 
available at http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/2014RS/bills/hb/hb0073f.pdf ; S.B. 247, 2014 
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2014) (introduced Jan. 17, 2014), available at 
http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/2014RS/bills/sb/sb0247f.pdf. 
 83   See H.B. 80, 2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2014) (introduced Jan. 8, 2014), 
available at http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/2014RS/bills/hb/hb0073f.pdf. 
 84  For parts of the testimony before a Senate hearing on the bill, see Summary of 
House and Senate Hearings, DOGSBITE.ORG (Feb. 7, 2013), http://www.dogsbite.org/ 
media/maryland/senate-hearing-feb-2014.mp3.  Written Testimony by DogsBite.org: 
Opposition to Senate Bill 247, DOGSBITE.ORG (Feb. 6, 2014), http://www.dogsbite.org/ 
pdf/dogsbite-testimony-senate-02-06-2014-online-release.pdf. 
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caused by dogs “at large,” the bill was signed into law by Governor 
Martin O’Malley in April 2014.85 
VI. THE STATE OF THE LAW TODAY: A NEW POLICY DEBATE 
Two years after Solesky, the law is different but the debate 
remains the same.  What is the best policy approach for handling 
the costs of injuries caused by dogs?  Who should be responsible, 
and how should that responsibility be determined?  Which 
approach of the many available serves the best interests of those 
affected? 
As discussed above, jurisdictions looking to decide how to 
approach claims of liability for injuries caused by dogs have several 
different options to choose from.  First, there is the traditional 
approach that requires the plaintiff to show that the defendant knew 
or should have known of the dog’s dangerous propensities—
whether in support of a negligence or a strict liability cause of action.  
Second, there is the more prevalent strict liability approach, which 
exempts the plaintiff from proving this type of knowledge and, 
subject to a few exceptions and defenses, can result in liability even 
if the defendant was not negligent and the dog had never caused 
trouble in the past. 
The court’s approach in Solesky was not an entirely new one, but 
rather, it was a variation of the first approach.  It still required proof 
on the part of the plaintiff; however it recognized the possibility of 
meeting the burden based on a different type of proof.  Thus, 
conceptually, Solesky was neither a big departure from the applicable 
law at the time nor an adoption of the alternative, and more 
prevalent, view in other jurisdictions. 
The court in Solesky attempted to modify the common law in 
order to adapt to the available evidence of a social issue without 
destroying the common law’s doctrinal basis.  In contrast, the House 
and the Senate’s reaction to Solesky was a refusal to consider an 
alternative and an attempt to force a choice between the two first 
approaches.  When that failed, they agreed to compromise on what 
appears to be an entirely different approach.  Unfortunately, it is 
not. 
For cases against dog owners, the key provision of the new 
statute is the recognition that an injury caused by a dog creates a 
 
 85  See Maryland Legislature Mutes Landmark Ruling, Tracey v. Solesky, During 2014 
Legislative Session, DogsBite Blog (June 2, 2014), http://blog.dogsbite.org/2014/06/ 
maryland-legislature-mutes-landmark-ruling-tracey-v-solesky.html. 
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rebuttable presumption that the dog’s owner knew or should have 
known that the dog had vicious or dangerous propensities.86  The 
reference to the element of knowledge, of course, suggests that the 
statute is based upon the traditional Restatement approach.  The 
statute exempts the plaintiff from having to prove the knowledge at 
first, but since the presumption is rebuttable, once rebutted, 
plaintiffs will find themselves in exactly the same position they 
would have been in before Solesky was decided.  Therefore, whether 
the change benefits the victims will depend on how easy it will be 
to rebut the presumption.  This explains why this very question was 
a point of contention that delayed the approval of the statute to 
begin with. 
With no guidance on how the presumption can be rebutted 
other than the fact that the question will always be an issue for the 
jury, the parties are essentially on notice that they should always 
prepare to litigate the case to the end.  For plaintiffs, this means that 
they need to be ready to present evidence to support the element of 
knowledge.  This is because they will never know whether the jury 
will find the defendant’s arguments sufficient to defeat the 
presumption before going to trial, or whether the judge might issue 
a judgment notwithstanding the verdict after the trial.  In other 
words, when preparing their case, plaintiffs will see no effect 
whatsoever from the presumption that supposedly relieves them 
from the duty to prove the defendant’s, and may, in fact, face higher 
costs in preparing for litigation. 
For defendants, on the other hand, the statute eliminates the 
possibility of winning on summary judgment by asking the court to 
conclude that the evidence shows as a matter of law that the 
presumption has been rebutted.  This means that, unless the 
defendants can support a motion to dismiss based on different 
issues, they will always have to face trial, which will definitely 
increase their litigation costs. 
Perhaps the effect of the new statute will be to encourage the 
parties to settle given the increased costs and the uncertainties of a 
possible trial.  This is always a good thing, but no different than in 
any other torts case.  In the end, the statute seems like a convoluted 
way to end in the same place the law was back in March of 2012. 
In cases against landlords, the effect of the statute is the same 
but more straightforward.  As the statute itself states, “in an action 
against a person other than the owner of a dog . . . the common law 
 
 86  MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-1901 (West 2014).  
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of liability . . . that existed on April 1, 2012. . . is retained . . . .”87 
Having traveled back in time, the question for the jurisdiction 
remains the same: which approach would advance the best public 
policy?  The answer is that the majority of the state senators had it 
right in 2012.  There is a reason the majority of jurisdictions have 
decided to adopt a strict liability approach to the issues raised by 
injuries caused by dogs.  It is the better approach and, if for some 
reason that seems unacceptable, it is Solesky that provides a good 
compromise. 
Proponents of the common law traditional approach argue it is 
unfair to impose liability on pet owners who were not negligent and 
who had no notice that their pets had a propensity to cause injury.  
Yet, most jurisdictions have taken the position that it is not unfair 
because pet owners must understand that any pet has the potential 
to cause injury to others and, therefore, pet ownership carries with 
it the possible costs of being responsible for those injuries.88 
As is typical in tort law, the issue comes down to a cost benefit 
analysis.  The costs attached to possible liability are less than the 
benefits gained by imposing strict liability.89  The principle of strict 
liability is based on the fact that certain activities or circumstances 
create high levels of risk of injury.90  As a society, we accept those 
risks because the activities also offer certain benefits.  In order to get 
the benefits, we are willing to take the risks; but, we have also 
decided to ensure that those who create the risk understand their 
responsibility for possible injuries because they are in a better 
 
 87  MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-1901(b) (West 2014). 
 88  See File v. Duewer, 869 N.E.2d 432 (Ill. App. 2007) (noting that the Animal 
Control Act imposes strict liability because it is intended to protect those who may not 
have any way of knowing or avoiding the risk the animal poses to them); Beggs v. 
Griffith, 913 N.E.2d 1230 (2009) (explaining that, because liability is mandated under 
the Animal Control Act for injuries caused by animals, the existence of the law serves 
as an incentive to keep one’s animals from harming another); Garcia v. Nelson, 759 
N.E.2d 601 (2001) (discussing how the purpose of the Animal Control Act is to protect 
public by encouraging tight control of animals). 
 89  This view is reflected in comments d and e to section 509 of the Restatement 
(Second), which support the view that there is no social value in keeping animals that 
are vicious or have other dangerous propensities that are in excess of those necessary 
for their utility and are abnormal to their class.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 509 
cmts. d, e (1965). 
 90  See DOBBS, supra note 24, at 942 (explaining that strict liability cases have in 
common the fact that the defendant creates or introduces a dangerous condition not 
commonly accepted in society).  See also Indiana Harbor v. American Cyanamid, 916 
F.2d 1174, 1177 (7th Cir. 1990) (“[T]he greater the risk . . . the stronger . . . the case for 
strict liability.”). 
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position to manage the costs of the possible injuries.91  This is the 
basic principle behind the notion of strict liability for inherently or 
abnormally dangerous activities and for liability for injuries caused 
by animals.92  Thus, dog owners need to be on notice that all dogs 
create certain risks and must be ready for the consequences of 
possible liability because of those risks.  Likewise, landlords must 
also be on notice that leasing properties to tenants with dogs carries 
with it the risk of possible liability.  Owners and landlords can 
manage those risks by obtaining insurance and taking other 
necessary precautions to prevent possible injuries.93  Given the risks 
involved, the additional costs related to insurance are just part of 
the costs of dog ownership and of leasing properties to dog owners. 
Though it has been argued that it is difficult to obtain insurance, the 
Department of Legislative Services of the Maryland General 
Assembly has concluded that insurance costs are not higher in states 
that have adopted a strict liability approach.94  The Department has 
also concluded that only three of the top ten insurers who provide 
homeowners insurance in Maryland have exclusions or limits on 
coverage for injuries caused by specific dog breeds.95  In addition, 
the fact that the need to obtain insurance and prepare for possible 
eventualities may raise costs for owners and landlords does not 
mean it is unfair.  All it means is that it is better to place the possible 
responsibility for injuries on those who are in the best position to 
manage the costs of those possible injuries. 
 
 
 
 91  See DOBBS, supra note 24, at 950 (explaining that the idea behind strict liability 
is not necessarily to deter certain activities altogether, but to make them “pay their way” 
by charging them with liability for harms). 
 92  See DOBBS, supra note 24, at 942 (explaining that strict liability cases have in 
common the fact that the defendant creates or introduces a dangerous condition not 
commonly accepted in society).  See also Indiana Harbor v. American Cyanamid, 916 
F.2d 1174, 1177 (7th Cir. 1990) (“[T]he greater the risk . . . the stronger . . . the case for 
strict liability.”). 
 93  MD. GEN. ASSEMB. DEP’T OF LEGIS. SERVS., FISCAL AND POLICY NOTE, H.B. 73 2014 
Sess., at 5 (2014), available at http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/2014RS/fnotes/bil_0003/ 
hb0073.pdf; MD. GEN. ASSEMB. DEP’T OF LEGIS. SERVS., FISCAL AND POLICY NOTE, S.B. 247, 
2014 Sess., at 5 (2014), available at http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/2014RS/fnotes/ 
bil_0007/sb0247.pdf. 
 94  MD. GEN. ASSEMB. DEP’T OF LEGIS. SERVS., DOG BITES IN OTHER STATES: DATA 
INSURANCE COVERAGE, AND LIABILITY, 2013 Sess., at 23 (2014).  See also supra note 53. 
 95  See supra note 53. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
Because it attempted to modify the common law, and because 
it used a breed-specific approach, Tracey v. Solesky has been criticized 
and eventually abrogated.  Yet, upon closer examination, it should 
be clear that the decision of the court was not an example of “panic 
policymaking,” to borrow the ABA’s description of breed-specific 
regulation.  It was neither a big departure from the applicable law at 
the time nor an adoption of the alternative, and more prevalent, 
view in other jurisdictions.  If there was any “panic policymaking,” 
it was the scramble by the legislature to find a way to revert back to 
the common law predating the case.  A more careful consideration 
of the options available for balancing the interests involved should 
have resulted in either adopting the prevalent view in the majority 
of jurisdictions or in an understanding of how Solesky actually 
advanced a better public policy than the common law it modified. 
Instead, as a result of the recently adopted statute enacted to 
abrogate the result in Solesky, the law as it stands is a collage of 
different approaches to deal with the same problem.  There is a 
standard that applies to owners of dogs that cause injuries while at 
large and a different standard that applies to other dog owners and 
to landlords; but, the latter is applied differently depending on 
whether the defendant is an owner or a landlord.  If nothing else, it 
would be easier to simply adopt a better standard for all cases 
involving injuries caused by dogs. 
Additionally, although the effect of the newly adopted statute 
may make it slightly easier for plaintiffs to support a claim in the 
initial stages or to settle it, it is more favorable to dog owners and 
landlords.  The statute does very little to balance the interests 
involved.  If anything, the statute essentially returns the law to what 
it was under the traditional approach, while maybe encouraging the 
parties in a lawsuit to settle before taking their chances with a jury.  
This is not entirely a bad thing; however, since the vast majority of 
lawsuits settle anyway, it does not sound like a major change or an 
advantage to the victims. 
Rather than creating different standards and reverting to the old 
common law, the legislature should have adopted a non-breed-
specific strict liability standard, just like the one adopted by the 
majority of American jurisdictions.  It is unfortunate that it took two 
years to enact a new “compromise statute” that is really no 
compromise at all, but instead, paves the way back to the past. 
